Across EU Member States, initiatives are being proposed to restrict children’s access to social media below a certain age, prompting the European Commission to discuss setting a harmonised ‘age of digital majority’. The rationale for these initiatives stems from concerns about the design features of social media platforms and their potential negative impact on children, their rights and their well-being. How such social media restrictions should be shaped in practice, or whether they should exist at all, however, is not clear-cut. Deciding on the ‘right’ age, on a reliable and proportionate method of age verification – if one exists at all (Joint statement of security and privacy scientists and researchers on age assurance) – and on which platforms should fall within the age limits (all of them, some, and if so, which ones) is harder than it appears. Moreover, the debate driving these restrictions tends to underestimate the collateral costs to the benefits children gain from spending time on social media platforms and on children’s autonomy. This becomes apparent when children are asked about the proposed restrictions themselves. A consultation with children across several Member States showed a mixed picture: 33% of participants somewhat or strongly agreed the measures would make them feel safer online, 23% were unsure, and 45% disagreed. Their biggest worries are linked to freedom, responsibility and social connection, especially staying in touch with friends (EU Kids Online, 2026). In the 2026 Eurobarometer survey, 48% of adolescents reported that social media had a fairly or very positive impact on their mental wellbeing, and benefits included entertainment (57%), contact with friends or family (53%), a sense of connection with others (70%), and learning opportunities (65%) (European Union, 2026).
Looking at the debate through a (less obvious) human rights lens
Social media restrictions engage a range of fundamental rights, including children’s freedom of expression and access to information, and the right to privacy, not of children alone but of all users affected by age assurance measures. More broadly, they reflect a recurring challenge in children’s rights discourse: how to balance children’s need for protection against risks with their rights to participation, autonomy and development, while taking account of their evolving capacities. While discussions on social media restrictions have largely focused on these established rights and interests, they can also be connected to emerging debates on a potential right to use the internet (R2UI) and a right not to use the internet (RN2UI). In both scholarship and policy, the R2UI is increasingly advocated for as either a standalone right or one derivable from existing human rights guarantees (such as the right to freedom of expression and information or the right to privacy; Mildebrath, 2021). The RN2UI, in contrast, is a far less explored concept, but one that is steadily drawing attention (Kloza et al, 2025). It has been linked to concepts such as autonomy and dignity and has been framed as the negative dimension of the right to access the internet, or as an ‘enabler’ right of other rights and freedoms (Ergin et al, 2026; Kloza et al, 2025).
A right to use social media – or a right to use better social media?
The R2UI, on the one hand, emerges against the background of an increasingly digital society, in which – as the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed – the internet is a crucial means to exercise rights and participate in society (Cengiz and others v Turkey, 2015). Healthcare, public services, employment and education are increasingly offered online. In certain contexts, such essential services are provided on a digital-by-default basis and offline alternatives are phased out or even abolished. The R2UI is also argued for in the context of digital inclusion strategies, which aim to close the digital divide and offer citizens access to the online sphere. Whereas the ‘online sphere’ or ‘the internet’ are broad concepts, the R2UI raises questions not only about which services should be covered by such a right, but also about the quality of those services. Access alone may not be sufficient if the service in question undermines rather than supports the exercise of rights and freedoms.
Applied to social media restrictions, the first question is whether the R2UI could offer a foundation for a child’s right to use social media. Whereas for adults it might be essential to have internet access to submit a tax return or consult health records, for many children (and arguably adults as well), social media platforms are, as the research shows, crucial spaces to communicate, relax, share and create content, and access information and support – and thus to exercise their rights to expression, information, assembly and play under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Osman et al, 2026; Staksrud et al, 2026).
At the same time, whether the R2UI is conceptualised as a new stand-alone right or linked to existing ones, it is not absolute. Restrictions may be imposed where they are prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim and are necessary in a democratic society. Internet access is, of course, already restricted in particular settings. For adults this might be the case in the workplace or in prisons; for children the same might be true in schools. Such restrictions are context-bound – they limit access as a whole, or to specific services or content. Social media restrictions are different in kind. They too target specific platforms but are linked to a category of users – children – instead of a context. If the R2UI did entail a right to access social media, a restriction could in principle still be justified to protect children from the risk of harm that these platforms entail. A balancing exercise based on the best interests of the child could tilt toward a restriction if the harms related to content, conduct or contract risks outweigh the opportunities, with the evolving capacities principle informing the age threshold. In Australia, that exercise is now before the High Court, where the world-first ban (or ‘delay’) for under-16s is challenged as a disproportionate restriction on their freedom of political communication and rights to expression, information and participation under the CRC and the ICCPR (Digital Freedom Project Inc v Commonwealth, S163/2025). The plaintiffs accept that protecting children from online harms is a legitimate aim but contend that the adopted restriction is disproportionate: it does not target the design features that cause the harm and less restrictive alternatives – such as safe-design duties on providers – exist.
This raises the question whether, if we accept that social media access is as essential for children as the internet is for adults to engage with essential services, the R2UI might extend beyond the mere question of having access and also provide a foundation for requiring that the social media spaces that children do use comply with certain quality requirements. Just as the R2UI is increasingly understood to require an internet that respects users’ rights, rather than mere connectivity (Reglitz, 2024), could it ground a claim not simply to social media, but to better platforms that respect children’s rights?
A right not to use social media – or a right to choose (meaningfully) whether and when to use social media?
The RN2UI, on the other hand, emerges in a context where debates about how essential the internet has become for participating in society overlook the fact that some individuals cannot use it, lack the skills to do so, or simply do not want to. Choosing not to use the internet may stem from various motivations, including a preference for offline spaces and communications, concerns about risks related to internet use (e.g. the processing of personal data), or defiance of the power of big tech companies. Although the RN2UI is rarely raised in the debate on social media restrictions, it has surfaced around the compulsory use of digital learning platforms and EdTech, where some parents and children prefer, or need, offline alternatives.
Applied to social media restrictions, the RN2UI could reframe the question as one of autonomy: should it be for children to decide for themselves not to use (certain) platforms, rather than having governments decide for them? Social media is deeply embedded in many children’s lives, and quitting is rarely easy; nonetheless, their experiences are varied. When 12-15-year-olds in Australia were interviewed about the proposed under-16 ban, they described a wide spectrum of social media experiences, ranging from non-use and infrequent engagement to daily use (Osman et al, 2026). Children consulted across Europe reported similarly varied patterns – from being online for hours a day to days without going online at all – and some spoke of consciously going offline, taking a digital detox or preferring offline activities (European Commission, 2022). Moreover, despite its name (‘not’ using the internet), the RN2UI might also ground a right, or choice, not to use the internet sometimes. This could encourage making features available that facilitate disconnection at certain times, also within social media environments.
We have also argued before that, when it comes to children’s rights to information and leisure, the UNCRC provides states with incentives to ensure that offline alternatives to online information and entertainment are available (Lievens & Verdoodt, 2025). From this perspective, the RN2UI invites reflection on whether children should have more meaningful alternatives to social media for certain activities. For children who use social media to stay in touch with their friends, this could mean more opportunities to meet in person – through sports clubs, youth movements, or community activities. For access to information, schools and libraries, or other public institutions can continue to play an important role. Of course, these alternatives should not be romanticised. They are unlikely to replace the functions that social media fulfil in children’s lives, nor should they. Yet the RN2UI reminds us that the debate about children’s access to social media should not just focus on restrictions but extend to whether there are genuine alternatives for them to engage with in the first place.
Acknowledgement: the research on which this blogpost is based is funded by the FWO Vlaanderen (grant number G000325N; Observatory of the Right (not) to Use the Internet).
